Tēma: Notikumi pasaulē, EU/ASV,NATO u.tml.

Kopš: 27. Oct 2023

Ziņojumi: 1664

Braucu ar:

04 Jan 2026, 20:47:20 @Briize rakstīja:
..
Lūk ja šis notiks un pēc visa spriežot tāda iespējamība izskatās ir samērā liela, tad tak sanāks ka viena Nato valsts ir uzbrukusi otrai Nato valstij...
..

Kopš: 18. Sep 2008

Ziņojumi: 22859

Braucu ar: RVR

04 Jan 2026, 20:47:20 @Briize rakstīja:

sanāks ka viena Nato valsts ir uzbrukusi otrai Nato valstij...
Tas principā pilnībā diskreditē tos alianses pamatprincipus uz kuriem tā balstās un kas tālāk...?
Šis ir diezgan mīzīgi, jo tiešā veidā tad skars arī mūsu drošības jautājumus...

Kopš: 22. Apr 2008

Ziņojumi: 10098

Braucu ar: Alfu

Kopš: 08. Sep 2023

Ziņojumi: 854

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 10:28:19 @RVR rakstīja:

04 Jan 2026, 20:47:20 @Briize rakstīja:

sanāks ka viena Nato valsts ir uzbrukusi otrai Nato valstij...
Tas principā pilnībā diskreditē tos alianses pamatprincipus uz kuriem tā balstās un kas tālāk...?
Šis ir diezgan mīzīgi, jo tiešā veidā tad skars arī mūsu drošības jautājumus...

Tāda situācija vēsturē jau ir bijusi, Turcijas konflikts ar Grieķiju Kiprā 1974. gadā. Formāli, protams, tas nebija karš starp šīm divām valstīm, bet tomēr tas bija militārs konflikts.
Alianse šajā konfliktā neiesaistījās un neko tas nemainīja tās tālākajā pastāvēšanā.

Kopš: 03. Sep 2015

Ziņojumi: 1560

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 10:28:19 @RVR rakstīja:

04 Jan 2026, 20:47:20 @Briize rakstīja:

sanāks ka viena Nato valsts ir uzbrukusi otrai Nato valstij...
Tas principā pilnībā diskreditē tos alianses pamatprincipus uz kuriem tā balstās un kas tālāk...?
Šis ir diezgan mīzīgi, jo tiešā veidā tad skars arī mūsu drošības jautājumus...

Tāda situācija vēsturē jau ir bijusi, Turcijas konflikts ar Grieķiju Kiprā 1974. gadā. Formāli, protams, tas nebija karš starp šīm divām valstīm, bet tomēr tas bija militārs konflikts.
Alianse šajā konfliktā neiesaistījās un neko tas nemainīja tās tālākajā pastāvēšanā.

Kopš: 18. Sep 2008

Ziņojumi: 22859

Braucu ar: RVR

05 Jan 2026, 11:51:09 @versatile rakstīja:

Tas formāli ir atslēgasvārds.
Toreiz ar to izbrauca cauri. Kā tagad?

Kopš: 05. Jan 2006

Ziņojumi: 7334

Braucu ar: E34

04 Jan 2026, 11:26:14 @Samsasi rakstīja:
tikmēr Berlīne izlēmīgi dodas klimatneitralitātes virzienā, atsakoties no elektrības.... tur esot sākusies zemes diena bez elektrības... tiesa gan tikai dažos rajonos... bet nu vienalga... Grētai patiks.

[ Šo ziņu laboja bum_bumz, 05 Jan 2026, 12:43:41 ]

Kopš: 22. Apr 2008

Ziņojumi: 10098

Braucu ar: Alfu

The Government of Cuba has announced that 32 Cubans were killed in the recent military operation by the United States to capture Venezuelan President President Nicolás Maduro, most of which were likely part of the security team protecting Maduro. Two days of mourning have been declared across Cuba.

Kopš: 04. Aug 2003

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 4880

Braucu ar: BMW E90 330i

05 Jan 2026, 12:39:58 @kkas rakstīja:
kurš patiesībā valda V?

The Government of Cuba has announced that 32 Cubans were killed in the recent military operation by the United States to capture Venezuelan President President Nicolás Maduro, most of which were likely part of the security team protecting Maduro. Two days of mourning have been declared across Cuba.

Kopš: 22. Apr 2008

Ziņojumi: 10098

Braucu ar: Alfu

I've been doing some digging, and the real target of the Venezuela attack was not China, it was Cuba.

Here's it is:

First, we can probably assume that one of the key architects of this plan was Marco Rubio. Rubio is one of the smartest and most competent members of the current administration, and his parents were Cuban exiles. So it's a little bit personal but more importantly, Rubio is extremely well-versed in the nuances of Latin American foreign policy - and he's Secretary of Steve (so it's his job) plus like three other jobs.

Second, Venezuela was (and still is today, even after Maduro's removal) essentially a country being run by Cuba. This began over 20 years ago under Chavez, when he turned to Cuba for help after an unsuccessful coup - he was deeply suspicious of his own military's loyalty. Cuba provided thousands of personnel - experts, doctors, sports advisors - all of them agents embedded throughout Venezuela at all levels, most notably in the military to monitor officers for disloyalty and overseeing management of key databases and surveillance systems. Over time, Cuba essentially took over running Venezuela, and this is one of the reasons why Chavez (and then Maduro) was "coup-proof."

Venezuela pays for the "services" of these Cuban professionals by sending oil to Cuba (up to 100,000 barrels a day at its peak). Venezuela is essentially Cuba's energy (and thus financial) lifeline. Cuban operatives were placed in charge of the direct physical security of the President (first Chavez, then Maduro). It's said that the Cuban troops had orders to kill Maduro if he looked like he was going to surrender to the US (I haven't confirmed this bit).

The US is not installing a new administration on the ground. It doesn't need to (yet), but it can take over key distribution endpoints (ports on the coast) using naval and air power. This is enough to interdict the shipments of oil or anything else to Cuba. It will probably create "Green Zones" in and around the ports. Outright regime change is hard and no one likes it, and Maduro wasn't a strongman who simply needed to be removed: he seems to just be kind of a figurehead.

The real source of the regime are the existing Cuban personnel still on the ground in Venezuela, so the "old regime" is still there, just without Maduro. Immediate inertia means that any resistance to the Cuban "occupiers" will be tepid at best while everyone figures out what's safe to do, which (in my opinion) accounts for VP Delcy's defiant response to the US and her demands for the US to return Maduro. It will take time for the US "sanctions" to weaken the strength of the Cuban force inside Venezuela. It's pretty unclear how things will actually transpire inside Venezuela, but again the US's main target is really the effect on Cuba.

So the reason for the attack really is "oil" (as Trump said) but not in the way we used to think about in the Gulf War. Setting up oil extraction operations will take a decade, so it's not an immediate goal. The immediate goal is to strangle Cuban finances and energy to weaken the Cuban regime. This fits nicely with the new administration's stated purpose to focus on security in the Western Hemisphere: Cuba has been a thorn in the side of America for a long time - this is a big step towards isolating it and eventually.... I don't know if there's going to be a direct intervention or not. But I'm pretty sure Rubio has a plan for that, whether or not it goes forward.

So Cuba is the major story.

That said, this is not without consequence for the US/China relationship. China having a foothold in the Western Hemisphere is not something the US likes (especially one on the side of South America closest to the US), and furthermore physical Chinese control of oil extraction operations is not something the US likes. At the same time, Venezuela is not a core interest for China, it was always kind of a bonus chit. And because the US can interdict the Venezuelan ports, it can stop the shipments of oil to China without having to take over the oil infrastructure. So removing Maduro happens to reset the China-Venezuela relationship.

The reason China was not the main geopolitical target here is because of two things:

1) If the US wanted China to get out of Venezuela, it could just blockade China and say "get out, it's our backyard." That's no more a violation of any "international norm" than outright kidnapping of a head of state. China isn't going to send an aircraft carrier.
2) The recent trade war was bruising enough. A direct confrontation would escalate tensions (again), which the administration has been busy de-escalating. An indirect move that neutralizes physical Chinese operation of the oil infrastructure works better.

Trump has already said that China will get its oil. This is significant. He's not saying "We're taking the oil now." And it's true, except that the main change here is that the US will eventually take over management of the oil extraction infrastructure and sell it to China - and in the meantime, the US has the storefront (ports). So China still gets its oil, at a somewhat higher price (market price rather than the deeply discounted rates as owner-operator), and the US gains an advantage in the relationship: it now has the power to stop sales to China if it needs a bargaining chip in the future.

There are a few other loose ends:

Russia is a much more deeply-embedded strategic partner to Venezuela. The US can make a deal with China to exit and become a customer, but Russia viewed Venezuela as "Cuba 2.0" - essentially a force projection node to threaten the US. Although China sold military hardware to the regime, it was largely operated by Russian contractors, many of them Wagner Group remnants. Russia will be harder to negotiate with, but maybe there are some follow-on operations about to happen.

Guyana (next door to Venezuela) had recently discovered vast oil fields, currently being operated by ExxonMobil. Maduro had made noises about annexing that region lately. He probably won't be doing that now.

There is also a major domestic priority served by this (other than just patriotic fervor). The Venezuelan diaspora is a source of migration pressure on the US. By seizing the country and creating "Green Zones" (or even just claiming to), the US can legally deport Venezuelan migrants back to "US-administered areas" in Venezuela. This is in line with the US's current [de-]immigration policies: you can round people up and kick them out, but they do need to land somewhere, and the jail in El Salvador is only so big.

So I would say: look for near-term action on Cuba - the administration probably wouldn't do it without Rubio in the mix, but he is - and it would align with current Western Hemisphere foreign policy goals and be a major (heh) coup because Trump could claim to resolve a decades-long foreign policy problem where past presidents failed. And, there might be action against Russia, at least enough to try and keep them off-balance so that they can't focus on destabilizing Venezuela.

More data or corrections on any of this are welcome, and cross-verifiable sources are appreciated.

Kopš: 23. Jul 2006

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 3926

Braucu ar: kruīzu

[ Šo ziņu laboja RaL, 05 Jan 2026, 15:11:26 ]

Kopš: 26. Apr 2004

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 7339

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 08:40:46 @Samsasi rakstīja:
cik var saprat no x, tad venezuelieši ir priecīgi, ka maduro ir prom. un tas, ka palestīnas frīki nomainījusi savus plastelīnas karodziņus pret venecuelas, vien jau parada, ka kautkas ir izdarīts pareizi.

Kopš: 22. Apr 2008

Ziņojumi: 10098

Braucu ar: Alfu

Kopš: 26. Apr 2004

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 7339

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 15:08:15 @RaL rakstīja:

Bet vispār nav skaidrs, kas būs tālāk, un liekas, ka īsti pasaulē vēl nesaprot, ko vispār darīt un kā reaģēt (vai asi nosodīt, vai ne )...

Kopš: 02. Jan 2009

Ziņojumi: 1224

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 15:08:15 @RaL rakstīja:
Ar Venecuēlu ir diezgan neskaidri plašākai publikai, kāpēc un kas būs tālāk, un, vai tur vispār kāds plāns apakšā bija, izņemot "es gribu".

Cirkulē nu jau 3 versijas, iemeslam:
- dēļ naftas un citiem izrakteņiem
- narkotiku kontrabandisti (sākotnēji oficiālā versija)
- Kubas efekts (skatīt iepriekšējo postu)

Bet vispār nav skaidrs, kas būs tālāk, un liekas, ka īsti pasaulē vēl nesaprot, ko vispār darīt un kā reaģēt (vai asi nosodīt, vai ne )...

Vietējie it kā priecīgi, bet tā īsti no malas nav saprotams, vai vispār kaut kas mainīsies viņiem par labu, jo jānotiek vēl kaut kam valsts iekšienē, lai varētu teikt, ka process pārmaiņām ir sācies. Tai pat laikā tramps pateicis, ka ASV vadīs valsti, bet nav skaidrs kā, un arī teica, ka iepriekšējās vēlēšanās uzvarējušajiem pārstāvjiem neesot atbalsta - tātad noprotams, ka grib sev kādu pakļāvīgu vadību, visticamāk diktatoru...
Pašā ASV nav īsti skaidrības, kā tas viss vispār var notikt un cik tas (ne)legāli, jo iebrukamu ir jāapstiprina Kongresam, bet līdz Kongresam šis jautājums vispār nav ticis.
Man personīgi šobrīd vispār liekas, ka ASV vadītu kāds diktators nevis vēlēts prezidents, kam būtu jāpakļaujas likumiem.
Nu un vēl tās starptautiskās tiesības un likumi, kuriem šis viss arī ir pretrunā.

Kopš: 22. Apr 2008

Ziņojumi: 10098

Braucu ar: Alfu

05 Jan 2026, 15:23:07 @Mizx rakstīja:

05 Jan 2026, 08:40:46 @Samsasi rakstīja:
cik var saprat no x, tad venezuelieši ir priecīgi, ka maduro ir prom. un tas, ka palestīnas frīki nomainījusi savus plastelīnas karodziņus pret venecuelas, vien jau parada, ka kautkas ir izdarīts pareizi.

Tikai emigrējušie priecājas. No BBC ziņām pašā Venecuēlā nekādas sajūsmas nav, visiem parasta ikdiena, pat parlamentā, tik cik dienaskārtībā bija prezidenta pilnvaru nodošanas balsojums Maduro vietniecei. Tur uz vietas stress par to, vai tiešām kaut kas būs citādi. Te jau pareizi uzrakstīja, ka tauta pieradusi pie gandrīz bezmaksas visa un negaida nekādu mežonīgo kapitālismu, kurā pēkšņi pašiem jāmaksā enerģijas un mājokļu rēķini. Benzīns 3 centi litrā...

“The formerly rich petro-state has seen GDP fall by 80% in less than a decade, driving some seven million of its citizens to flee. Most Venezuelans live on just a few dollars a month, with the health care and education systems in total disrepair and biting shortages of electricity and fuel” as of 2024, according to

Kopš: 26. Apr 2004

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 7339

Braucu ar:

05 Jan 2026, 15:32:10 @kkas rakstīja:

nemaz jau tik sen viņiem nav komunisms, pavisam nesen viss bija pat ļoti ok.

Kopš: 26. Jun 2013

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 8758

Braucu ar: e39 523

[ Šo ziņu laboja abyss, 05 Jan 2026, 17:30:48 ]

Kopš: 01. Sep 2013

No: Daugavpils

Ziņojumi: 3201

Braucu ar: MB;f15;LC

Kopš: 23. Jul 2006

No: Rīga

Ziņojumi: 3926

Braucu ar: kruīzu

05 Jan 2026, 18:29:04 @ralfiks rakstīja:
Man vispaar nav izskaidrojuma Kaapeec vairumaa valstu kas bagātas ar zemes dziiileem nav vispaareeja labklaajiiiba bet shauram lokam